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INTRODUCTION
Michael Dawson’s Behind the Mule, published in 1994, examines the group dynamics and identity of African Americans in politics.1 
Dawson gives blacks a collective consciousness rooted 
in a history of slavery and subsequent economic and 
social subjugation, and further argues that African 
Americans function as a unit because of their unique 
shared past.2 Dawson uses data from the 1988 National 
Black Election Panel Survey to analyze linked fate—
the belief that what happens to others in a person’s 
racial group affects them as individual members of the 
racial group—and group consciousness among blacks 
in the political sphere, and then examines the effects 
of black group identity on voter choice and political 
leanings. 5, 3
Dawson’s work is pertinent today in the years 
of the first African-American president, and even 
more so as African Americans become wealthier and 
more integrated into white America.4 Integration has 
bearings on the black group: group ties may become 
weaker, specifically in the political realm. As African 
Americans enter into the middle and upper classes, 
do they still identify with roots in slavery, segregation, 
and economic suppression? Are these roots aban-
doned for newly elevated class ties? Will most present-
day African Americans side with the candidate who 
looks like them, but doesn’t necessarily protect their 
personal economic interests? 
Dawson’s work piqued my interest, especially in 
an age in which some academics argue that the ideo-
logical gap between black and white Americans is 
shrinking.5 I want to expand on Dawson’s work and 
see if his idea is still applicable today. I have previously 
conducted case studies of four townships in the state 
of New Jersey that represent cross sections of race and 
class.6 I categorized Carteret, New Jersey as majority 
white and lower class; Morristown, New Jersey as ma-
jority white and middle class; Willingboro, New Jersey 
as majority black and middle class; and Orange, New 
Jersey as majority black and lower class.7 I analyzed 
the results of the 2008 presidential election in each 
of the four townships, and found that both majority 
black towns supported Obama at rates of over 90 per-
cent.8 The majority white towns still supported Obama 
at high rates, but not as high as in the majority black 
towns.9 I was not surprised by these results, as they 
were in line with what Dawson had predicted about 
black group politics.10 However, I was unable to find 
more precise data than that found at the precinct level, 
so my results could not be specified to particular in-
dividuals.11
The ecological inference problem piqued my in-
terest in obtaining individual data to apply my find-
ings at the personal level.13 This issue with ecological 
inference is that it assumes that individual-level analy-
sis of results can be understood based upon aggregate 
or group results.12 The aggregate data from my prior 
study was only useful at the township level. I wanted 
to view linked fate and candidate choice on a person-
by-person basis. I felt this relationship would present 
a more accurate and complete picture of each group’s 
voting decisions. Though the majority vote in each 
township went for Obama, I wanted to explore what 
subsets of the African-American group were likely 
voting for Obama, and which might be more inclined 
to vote for the Republican candidate.15 To do this, I 
decided to conduct a survey asking African-American 
voters about their adherence to linked fate and politi-
cal leanings. In addition, I was interested in testing 
whether, in an electoral contest where candidate race 
is set against socioeconomic status, an African-Amer-
ican voter would be more likely to base his or her vote 
upon the candidate’s race or class. I proposed an em-
bedded experiment in my survey that would establish 
a hypothetical election between four different poten-
tial candidates of varying race and economic-policy 
leanings. This would force the respondent to choose 
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in race and fiscal policy crossed pair-ups whether a 
candidate’s race or socioeconomic status would trump 
the other.
These different race and class pairings are tell-
ing because of the unique class and economic status 
typically attributed to African Americans as a group. 
13 Because of the history of slavery as well as the so-
cial, economic, and legal barriers placed on African 
Americans throughout U.S. history, African Ameri-
cans have been dealt a less opportune political status. 
Lack of economic diversity aided in the formation of a 
black political group, as fiscal interests were generally 
the same.14 However, I argue that the economic inter-
ests of the black group have begun to vary. Increasing 
economic diversity has the potential to separate the 
group, and could render Dawson’s findings of the late 
twentieth century less applicable now, twenty years 
later. 
I also revisited the four townships I studied to 
find out the precinct-level results for the 2012 elec-
tion, and whether these results are in line with my in-
dividual-level survey results. I conducted case studies 
of the four townships for the more recent election in 
order to see if group consciousness has strengthened 
or weakened. This may corroborate or contradict my 
survey results. Revisiting these townships was neces-
sary to make insightful comparisons with the newer 
individual-level results.
I have discussed Claudine Gay’s work on the ef-
fects of neighborhood status, quality, and segregation 
on feelings of linked fate, political group conscious-
ness, and the black vote.15 I am interested in looking 
at how living in close proximity to other blacks af-
fects the strength of group unity, and if this unity is 
lessened by living in more integrated or mostly white 
neighborhoods.
 In conclusion, I find this research to be com-
pelling due to its implications for understanding the 
black political community in the United States. I be-
lieve the study will contribute to a further comprehen-
sion of the factors affecting political integration and 
the status of blacks today. There may be further im-
plications for the study of affirmative action, neigh-
borhood integration, and more recently, the political 
effects of racially biased police brutality and mass 
incarceration. I hope that this study will shed light 
on the uniqueness of the African-American political 
group, both in the past and today.
Literature Review and Expectations
Dawson’s Behind the Mule considers race and 
socioeconomic status among African Americans as 
factors for political choice. Dawson describes a cer-
tain “New Black Politics… characterized by the trans-
formation of protest politics into electoral politics 
with high levels of black political unity… an image of 
profound political unity that transcends class.”16 This 
“new” form of black politics defined by Dawson in 
1994 places an emphasis on the group consciousness 
that accompanies African Americans in the political 
arena and at the polls. Dawson discusses this black 
political unity in terms of what he calls a “black utility 
heuristic”17:
It is quite clear that, until the mid-1960s, race was 
the decisive factor in determining the opportuni-
ties and life chances available to virtually all Af-
rican Americans, regardless of their own or their 
family’s social and economic status. Consequently, 
it was much more effective for African Americans 
to determine what was good for the racial group 
than to determine what was good for themselves 
individually. It was more efficient for them to use 
the status of the group, both relative and absolute, 
as a proxy for individual utility.18
This black utility heuristic historically assisted 
African Americans in choosing which ideologies and 
political values fit them best as a group. Because Af-
rican Americans have a unique history with roots in 
slavery, segregation, and economic subjugation, vot-
ing as a group has meant more political power and 
typically has made sense for most black individuals 
struggling with similar fiscal, social, and political is-
sues. By working as a group, blacks could advance fur-
ther. Therefore, they would be communally furthering 
the interests of the entire group. 19
However, I argue that in the years since Dawson’s 
book was published, perhaps a newer black political 
functioning has emerged. Where race used to trump 
socioeconomic status, class status is now gaining in-
creasing importance for African Americans in the po-
litical realm. In 1994, Dawson wrote:
Economic polarization among African Americans 
has indeed been increasing over the past twenty 
years. Both the middle class and the group of eco-
nomically marginalized African Americans have 
grown… In the future, the new black middle class 
may not identify as strongly with the black com-
munity, the Democratic Party, or liberal causes…
Many would argue that economic polarization 
within the black community will continue to in-
82
columbia university journal of politics & society
crease throughout the 1990s and will bring in its 
wake increasing political polarization.20
I plan to investigate whether economic stratifica-
tion in the black community has strained the historic 
political unanimity of African Americans. Dawson 
calls on the “black utility heuristic,” the strength and 
unity of the black network, and individually linked 
fate as reasons for sustained black political accord.21 
However, I suggest that in recent year; political effi-
cacy, ties to the black network, and the sense of com-
mon identity among blacks have all begun to dissipate. 
Furthermore, residential separation within the black 
community has become a more frequent occurrence. 
Taken together, these two factors may suggest that 
black political unity has begun to weaken.22
The black middle class is distinct from the larger 
black community in the United States. Middle-class 
African Americans have separated themselves both 
from the lower class and the distant upper class. This 
has led to a ‘pulling away’ of the African American 
class structure at both ends as the top becomes a main-
stream bourgeoisie and the bottom is condemned to 
‘“ever-widening poverty.”23 The middle class is forced 
either into isolation in the middle or forced to draw 
closer to the upper or lower class. Dawson writes that 
the black middle class tends to mirror the black lower 
class economically in some ways, as the government 
largely employs the middle class. On the other hand, 
he cites Kilson (1983), who argues that the black 
middle class has begun a process of “status deracial-
ization.”24 Middle-class blacks have joined the ranks of 
higher-class workers, and, as such, the characteristic 
historical racial identity of economic subjugation be-
comes convoluted with higher-class economic inter-
ests.25  Still, Dawson notes, “[t]he contradictory forces 
working in the black middle class have led to what 
Kilson (1983) has referred to as the ‘insider/outsider’ 
syndrome. He documents that over 80% of this class 
still feel racial obligations”.26 Though the middle has 
separated itself economically from the African Ameri-
cans as a group, overall it still feels a sense of loyalty to 
black political unity.
Linked fate is tied together with black group con-
sciousness as well as with the black utility heuristic. 
This concept of linked fate causes African Americans 
feel their “fate,” or outcome, is impacted by and tied 
into that of the African American community as a 
whole.27 Through my survey and the rest of my study, 
I seek to find how strong this sense of linked fate is 
and whether it exists in different levels of intensity be-
tween different socioeconomic class levels. Dawson, 
in his later book (2001), Black Visions: The Roots of 
Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, 
writes, “the great majority of blacks continue, my pre-
vious and current work shows, to see their fate linked 
to that of the race, but how that linkage gets interpret-
ed is based partly on social position but also partly on 
ideological orientation.”28 My study questions whether 
this notion still holds true today.
A Pew Research Center report from 2007, 
“Blacks See Growing Values Gap Between Poor and 
Middle Class,” argues that blacks are now more segre-
gated because of widening class differences within the 
racial group:29 “African Americans see a widening gulf 
between the values of middle class and poor blacks, 
and nearly four-in-ten say that because of the diver-
sity within their community, blacks can no longer be 
thought of as a single race.”30 This claim implies that 
members of the black community may perceive them-
selves as less of a cohesive group due to differences in 
class ideals. This is especially significant for black po-
litical unity. If values are divergent among economic 
classes, this separates the black vote both ideologically 
and economically. Not only might this affect black 
economic choices, but political choices as well. In ad-
dition, the Pew study found that, “blacks and whites 
concur that there has been a convergence in the values 
held by blacks and whites.”31 If ideologies between the 
races are becoming similar, this may imply a political 
integration as well, or at least a lessening of diversity 
along racial lines. Within the past twenty years, blacks 
have also begun to less fervently support black leaders 
in politics, religion, and the NAACP less fervently.32 In 
the past, these figures have been unifying individuals, 
but more recently, they have arguably lost some power 
in the black community.
The Pew study also cites an interesting contrast 
to Dawson’s work, which may imply that this change 
is generational:
A 54% majority of African Americans say that 
blacks who don’t get ahead are mainly responsible 
for their situation, while just three-in-ten say dis-
crimination is mainly to blame. As recently as the 
mid 1990s, when Dawson’s book was published, 
black opinion on this question tilted in the oppo-
site direction, with a majority of African Ameri-
cans arguing that discrimination is the main rea-
son for a lack of black progress.35
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Views on this feeling of linked fate seemed to 
change around the time Dawson’s book was published 
in 1994. This could imply that Dawson’s thesis is, in 
present years, not as salient due to the diffusion of the 
black group. But why would this potential switch oc-
cur in the mid-1990s? What changed within this time 
frame? 
In Clemetson’s 2003 article, “Younger Blacks tell 
Democrats to take Notice,” the author takes notice 
of this same decline in strength of linked fate among 
blacks in recent years. Clemetson points to the age 
bracket of eighteen- to thirty-five-year olds that were 
not alive during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement.34 
This is significant in illuminating the pertinence, or 
lack thereof, of Dawson’s work today. If eighteen- to 
thirty-five-year olds, the younger population of vot-
ing-age blacks, make up almost half of the total eli-
gible black voter population—about 40%—then this 
age range is extremely important to the black vote 
as a whole.35 In 1988, when the Black National Elec-
tion Panel survey was taken, we find that a person 
aged twenty-seven, the median age for the eighteen 
to thirty-five cohort, would have been born in 1961. 
This means that this individual would have grown up 
during the Civil Rights Era. Further, his or her parents 
may have been active or instilled civil rights values in 
their children during this time of powerful black soli-
darity. However, a person that is twenty-seven in 2003, 
when Clemetson’s article was written, was born in the 
late 1970s. They missed growing up in the Civil Rights 
Movement by a few years. This younger generation 
may have been further removed from the Movement, 
and may not have the same strength of black group 
unity as those of the previous generation. 
Because the Civil Rights Movement roughly last-
ed from 1955 to 1968, any children born after this time 
frame may not have experienced a sense of the magni-
tude of the Movement.36 Black National Election Panel 
survey, which surveyed many who had grown up in 
this time period, reveals strong black unity and linked 
fate among African Americans. If the following gen-
eration was more likely to take the gains made during 
the Civil Rights Movement for granted, then it is also 
possible that unity began to decline after this year. Per-
haps African Americans are more satisfied with where 
they are today. As the time gap from the 1960s strug-
gle increases and as African Americans perform better 
economically and socially, they may feel that there is 
less need for a new civil rights Movement or strategic 
unity. I will analyze questions on linked fate, as well 
as hypothetical election results, by age range in order 
to see whether age makes a difference in strength of 
linked fate.
In Wypijewski’s 2004 article “Black and Bruised,” 
the changing political loyalties of African Americans 
are further corroborated. An interviewee in Wypi-
jewski’s article argued that “‘Many blacks stay home 
for the election because they feel that neither party is 
attending to their needs… [The] divide in America 
ain’t black and white; it’s the haves and the have-nots, 
and that’s the truth, darling.’”37 Some African Ameri-
cans perceive this divide along class lines as being 
even stronger than that along racial lines. In addition, 
neither party always satisfies the entirety of African 
American voters. Still, one of the women interviewed 
in the article states, “No one I met in the 18-to-35-
year-old cohort said, as did James Sulton, at eighty the 
lion of one of Orangeburgs’ grand families, 'I’d vote for 
the Devil if he was a Democrat.’38 This level of com-
mitment to the Democratic Party is arguably strongest 
among the older members of black America, as these 
members grew up through the Civil Rights Movement 
and saw what the Republican Party failed to do at that 
time. Today, it may seem that “the only thing anyone 
knows for sure about ‘the black vote’ is that it’s not 
monolithic.”39 What once used to be a seamless, stable 
voter group may now be more divided among differ-
ent classes, identities, and values. 
In their 2010 article, “Is Racial Linked Fate 
Unique? Comparing Race, Ethnicity Class, Gender, 
and Religion,” Claudine Gay and Jennifer Hochschild 
discuss the weakening of this group feeling of linked fu-
tures. Their article states, “In seven surveys from 1984 
through 2008, the proportion of Blacks who perceive 
racial commonality ranged between 65 and 83percent, 
trending downwards in the 2000s compared with ear-
lier decades.”40 The fact that linked fate has weakened 
in the 2000s points again toward the idea that the Civil 
Rights Movement may have had strong linked-fate ef-
fects for those born during that time. As a result, in 
more recent years, these effects have waned and have 
resulted in a collectively weaker sense of linked fate. In 
addition, the authors write that the strength of linked 
fate may increase and lessen based on social class.41 I 
agree that group consciousness and shared fate among 
African Americans may be lessened because of differ-
ences in economic preferences and demands. This will 
be tested in the survey as well.
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Gay and Hochschild acknowledge that for blacks, 
“cultivating or recognizing the fact that one’s own life 
chances are likely to rise and fall as Blacks gain or lose 
political and social standing enables one to use a few 
strong cues to make sense of the complex American 
racial arena. Perhaps ironically, linked fate in this logic 
is as much a matter of self-interest as of group well-
being.”42 The article demonstrates that perhaps linked 
fate is decreasing among the African American popu-
lation. The authors also found that lower-class blacks 
do not necessarily show stronger linked fate than 
upper-class blacks.43 The authors conclude with an 
interesting inquiry: is linked fate “primarily a heuris-
tic or primarily an identity?”44 Asking whether black 
linked fate functions solely as an agent for the black 
community, or whether it also defines such commu-
nity brings us closer to understanding how this char-
acteristic affects the political arena. The authors claim 
that “linked fate perceptions are neither consistently 
nor highly politicized,” but I disagree.45 Especially in 
the past, linked fate has arguably had a strong impact 
on African-American voters, even though this impact 
could potentially be decreasing. 
Claudine Gay, in her article “Putting Race in 
Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants 
of Black Racial Attitudes,” discusses the effects of racial 
segregation in neighborhoods on black political unity. 
She argues that segregation might have significant ef-
fects on the perpetuation of these feelings of linked fate 
and group consciousness.46 Because different levels of 
socioeconomic status typically experience differing 
degrees of neighborhood quality, neighborhood qual-
ity may have an effect on how African Americans view 
themselves in relation to the larger group. For example, 
even middle-class African Americans will, on average, 
live in worse conditions than white people of similar 
income levels: “For African Americans…the inabil-
ity to secure favorable residential circumstances may 
encourage the belief that race still defines and limits 
the prospects for socioeconomic attainment”.47 On the 
other hand, African Americans of high-income and 
class status are less likely to be surrounded by poor 
living conditions. In turn, they may be less inclined 
to think that being black means suffering injustice.48 
This could potentially lead to a decline in linked fate 
among high-income blacks. Therefore I have includ-
ed a section in my survey asking respondents about 
neighborhood quality, and I analyze these questions 
by income brackets. 
From the previous literature on African Ameri-
cans and linked fate, there are many different camps 
that attempt to describe African-American political 
behavior and linked fate. Through my experimental 
survey, I will attempt to discern which of these claims 
are correct and which are unsupported. I hypothesize 
that linked fate has decreased to a degree, especially 
among younger African Americans, and to some de-
gree among middle- and upper class African Ameri-
cans. By analyzing vote choice, linked fate ascriptions, 
and neighborhood quality, I will test levels of linked 
fate among different groups of the African American 
community today. I plan to find whether race or so-
cioeconomic status is more politically salient for Afri-
can Americans.
JUNIOR PAPER: REPLICATION OF RESULTS
My junior independent work analyzed whether 
race or socioeconomic status is more salient for Af-
rican American voters. To approach this question, I 
analyzed the 2008 presidential election results within 
four townships of New Jersey. The aggregate results 
showed very high levels of linked fate among blacks. 
The results of my junior paper aligned with Dawson’s 
1994 results; however, I believe that looking at indi-
vidual level data may show that social class ties have 
begun to trump race after all, at least in some black 
socioeconomic groups.
Results: 2008 Election
In my junior case study, I analyzed four New Jer-
sey townships that crossed different majorities of race 
and socioeconomic status in order to discern if one 
was more important for black voters than the other.49 I 
looked at Orange, Carteret, Willingboro, and Morris-
town. The townships were all comparable in popula-
tion size, and each had similar numbers of blacks and 
whites as a majority, respectively. The socioeconomi-
cally similar townships were similar in income level 
as well. Morristown and Carteret were majority white 
townships, and Willingboro and Orange were major-
ity black. I categorized Morristown and Willingboro 
as middle class, and Orange and Carteret as lower 
class. By crossing both race and class, I could compare 
African American group voting habits to white voting 
habits, and middle class to lower class group choices.50
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P o v e r t y 
rate (%)
Morristown 18,411 14.0 62.5 64,279 9.5
Carteret 22,844 14.85 50.68 58,614 13.0
Willingboro 31,629 72.7 17.3 66,479 8.6
Orange 30,134 71.83 12.8 40,818 18.1
My hypothesis was that, due to black group con-
sciousness, feelings of linked fate, and ascribing to the 
black utility heuristic, the African American town-
ships would vote for Obama at similar, very high rates. 
The lower class white township, Carteret, would prob-
ably vote along socioeconomic lines. The upper class 
white township, Morristown, would do so as well, and 
as a result, they would split Obama and McCain, re-
spectively.51
For my results, I used precinct-level data taken 
from an ArcGIS map created by Stanford University 
in 2008.  The precinct-level results are in the table be-
low.52
Election Summary Tables (2008)
Carteret (Lower class, majority white)
Year Obama McCain
2008 67.2% 32.8%
Orange (Lower class, majority black)
Year Obama McCain
2008 95.1% 4.9%
Willingboro (Middle class, majority black)
Year Obama McCain
2008 90.9% 9.1%
Morristown (Middle case, majority white)
Year Obama McCain
2008 69.9% 30.1%
As expected, Orange was extremely supportive 
of Obama at over 95 percent. Willingboro was a bit 
lower around 90 percent, perhaps due to the middle-
class fiscal values of many voters fervently clashing 
with Obama’s liberal economic policies. The results of 
Morristown and Carteret were both a bit surprising. I 
assumed that Morristown would vote along racial as 
well as economic lines. However, Morristown turned 
out at majority rates for Obama. Carteret, which I as-
sumed would turn out for Obama at high rates due to 
liberal economic ties, was less supportive of him than 
the wealthier Morristown.53
Replication of Results: 2012 Election
I chose to extend the results of my junior paper 
by replicating it for the 2012 election. I found the 2012 
general presidential election results for each of the 
above four townships and analyzed this data for any 
trends. I then compared it to the 2008 results. The data 
found for the recent 2012 election was taken from the 
county clerk’s records for each county of each town-
ship at the precinct level. The results were as follows.
Election Summary Tables (2008 and 2012)
Morristown












Year Obama Republican Opponent
2008 95.1% 4.9%
2012 96.07 2.84%
Comparing the 2008 data to the 2012 data, the 
following trends were apparent. First, in Morristown, 
support for Obama and the Republican opponent 
each year (John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 
2012) remained about the same. In the Carteret elec-
tions, support for Obama increased about 7 percent-
age points, and support for the Republican opponent 
decreased by about 8 percentage points. In Willing-
boro, there was not much change; the support for 
Obama only increased by about half of 1 percentage 
point, and the support for the Republican decreased 
by about 1.5 percentage points. And in Orange, the 
support for Obama and the Republican stayed about 
the same. This data tells us that there was not much 
change in support for Obama or the Republican op-
ponent outside of Carteret. Still, the fact that there was 
not much change in support for Obama in the ma-
jority black towns of Orange and Willingboro is not 
conclusive evidence for either an increase or decrease 
in linked fate at the individual level.
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EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY EXPLANATION
The survey portion of this study provides the 
individual results required to combat the ecological 
inference problem.54 There were 940 completed sur-
veys in total. The survey was internet-based and was 
sent out to African Americans of voting age across 
the United States by the distributor Survey Sampling 
International (SSI). The survey asked simple demo-
graphic questions concerning linked fate, neighbor-
hood quality, and the hypothetical election. Most of 
the survey questions were taken from the 1988 Na-
tional Black Election Panel Survey, the same survey 
used as Dawson’s dataset for his 1994 book.55 The sur-
vey shed light on African-American feelings of linked 
fate, the quality of their neighborhoods, and whom 
they would vote for in a hypothetical election. I chose 
to analyze the questions among brackets of income 
and age to see if different age and income brackets feel 
differently about their connection to the black group 
or their feelings about their neighborhood.
Demographic Information
The survey begins by asking demographic infor-
mation of the respondents in order to create a profile 
of each individual answering the survey. The high-
lighted questions in this section are income, social 
class, race, zip code, and political party. These ques-
tions reveal some of the targeted information I am 
looking for from individual respondents.
Questions on Linked Fate
The linked fate questions of the survey ask 
whether respondents ascribe to the idea of African 
American group consciousness and common destiny. 
These questions are taken from Jackson’s 1988 Nation-
al Black Election Panel Study, used in Dawson’s 1994 
book, which asks whether African Americans have a 
sense of racial group identity that applies to political 
unity and consciousness.56 The respondent will an-
swer most of the linked fate questions by ranking how 
much they agree with a certain statement.
Questions on Neighborhood Quality
The neighborhood questions included in the 
survey are linked to Claudine Gay’s work on neigh-
borhood quality and racial composition as it affects 
group consciousness, specifically among African 
Americans.57 The questions from this part of the sur-
vey are also taken from Jackson’s 1988 National Black 
Election Panel Survey.58 I hypothesize that neighbor-
hood racial dynamics may have varying influences on 
different classes of African Americans.
Experimental Design
The experimental portion of the survey helps 
uncover the main purpose of this study. I wanted to 
find out whether Dawson’s work on African Ameri-
cans and political linked fate still holds true today. 
The experiment is set up as a hypothetical presidential 
election in which the candidates vary by race and eco-
nomic ideology. 
There are six experimental conditions that arise 
from crossing race and economic ideology variables. 
In the experiment, the race manipulation is simple. 
Each condition varies a name indicating the race of the 
candidate as black (Kiara Jackson/Imani Williams) or 
white (Katherine Miller/Molly Harris) along with eco-
nomic ideology (liberal/conservative). I chose these 
names based on reports of the most common first and 
last names given to Caucasians and African Americans 
in the United States.59,60,61 The economic ideology will 
vary between liberals (Imani Williams/Molly Harris) 
and conservatives (Kiara Jackson/Katherine Miller). 
A fiscally liberal candidate is described as solving the 
budget deficit by raising taxes on the wealthy. The con-
servative candidate supports solving the budget defi-
cit by reducing wasteful spending on big government 
programs. The survey asks respondents which of two 
hypothetical candidates they would more likely vote 
for. The names of the candidates and listings of the 
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Candidate Matchups
Candidate Imani Williams Katherine Miller
Race Black White
Fiscal leaning Liberal Conservative
Candidate Imani Williams Kiara Jackson
Race Black Black
Fiscal leaning Liberal Conservative
Candidate Kiara Jackson Katherine Miller
Race Black White
Fiscal leaning Conservative Conservative
Candidate Katherine Miller Molly Harris
Race White White
Fiscal leaning Conservative Liberal
SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
I chose to analyze the data by separating them 
into three income brackets: high, middle, and low-in-
come. These three brackets result in fairly equal sam-
ple sizes and represent three differing levels of income 
to analyze for linked fate and for the hypothetical elec-
tion questions. The range of incomes collected within 
my study was between $0 and $100,000. By breaking 
down the income brackets into thirds, I came up with 
a rough definition of the three income brackets for 
my study. Low-income status is defined as earning an 
annual income of $0 to $29,999; middle-income sta-
tus is defined as having a yearly income of $30,000 to 
$59,000; and high-income status is defined as earning 
an annual salary of $60,000 to $100,000 or more. 
I created age brackets as well for the three desig-
nated age ranges. The oldest bracket includes birthdays 
from 1900 to 1962. The middle bracket includes birth 
dates from 1963 to 1980, and the last range is those 
1981 to 1994. The last and youngest bracket is around 
the eighteen-to thirty-five year old range of “young” 
African Americans who were born after the Civil 
Rights Movement. This group is composed of those 
who did not grow up during or in the immediate af-
termath of the Civil Rights Movement. These respon-
dents have been fairly removed temporally from the 
Civil Rights Movement. The middle and older ranges 
both include those born during the Movement. These 
age groups were chosen because they each made up 
about one third of the total respondents’ ages, making 
the samples about equal, and because each represents 
a different relation to the Civil Rights Movement of 
the 1960s.
Experimental Results
I created tables that cross each hypothetical can-
didate with her three opponents. The tables show how 
well each candidate fared in the election compared to 
her three opponents and if varying the identity of the 
opponent affected the respondent’s vote in the election 
involving that fixed candidate. The null hypothesis is 
that the identity of the opponent has no relationship 
to the candidate that is held fixed. To test the null hy-
pothesis, I conducted chi-squared tests on each race 
for all the candidate-opponent tables to check for in-
dependence. The results are as follows. Note also that 
each table repeats one of the elections.
By Income
Imani Williams (BL) Elections
I analyzed the elections by low, middle, and 
high-income brackets for each candidate table. For 
the Imani Williams (BL) table, among low-income 
respondents, Imani Williams won against all three op-
ponents. The margin was about 20 percent between 
Imani Williams (BL) and Katherine Miller (WC) (as 
expected among low-income voters), and the mar-
gin between Imani Williams (BL) and Kiara Jackson 
(BC) was smaller, at about 10 percent. There was a sig-
nificant difference between Imani Williams (BL) and 
Molly Harris (WL), with Imani Williams winning 64 
percent of the vote, and Molly Harris just winning 36 
percent.
For the middle-income category of respondents 
in the Imani Williams (BL) elections, Imani Williams 
beat all of her candidates, and the only significant 
margin was between Imani Williams and Kiara Jack-
son. This race yielded a significant p-value, as Imani 
Williams won about 66 percent of votes, and Kiara 
Jackson (BC) won about 34 percent. For the high-
income respondents in the Imani Williams elections, 
Imani Williams again won all of the elections, but not 
by a high enough margin to be significant in any of the 
three elections. The results for each income group in 
the Imani Williams elections are shown in the tables 
below.
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Support for Imani Williams (Black liberal)
All income levels



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Percent values approximated to nearest whole number.
Kiara Jackson (BC) Elections
Next, I analyze the Kiara Jackson (BC) elections 
for each income bracket. For the low-income category, 
Kiara Jackson took 45.8 percent of the votes, and her 
opponent, Imani Williams (BL), took 54.2 percent of 
the vote. Low-income respondents who were given the 
Kiara Jackson and Katherine Miller (WC) matchup 
voted 62.3 percent for Kiara Jackson and 37.7 percent 
for her opponent. In the low-income category, for the 
race between Kiara Jackson and Molly Harris (WL), 
Kiara Jackson received 27.9 percent of the vote, while 
Molly Harris received 72.1 percent. In addition, the 
significance for this test showed a p-value of 0.001091, 
meaning these results were significant at the 0.01 lev-
el. Only the election between Molly Harris and Kiara 
Jackson was significant at the 0.01 level.
In the middle-income category, for the Kiara 
Jackson (BC) contests, respondents ranged from mak-
ing $30,000 to $59,999 annually. In the race between 
Kiara Jackson and Imani Williams (BL), Kiara Jack-
son took 33.9 percent, while Imani Williams took 
66.1 percent. In the race between Kiara Jackson and 
Katherine Miller (WC), Kiara Jackson took 56.0 per-
cent and Katherine Miller took 44.0 percent. And in 
the race between Molly Harris (WL) and Kiara Jack-
son, Kiara Jackson took 30.2 percent of the vote, and 
Molly Harris took 69.8 percent. There was statistical 
significance for the margin between Imani Williams 
(BL) and Kiara Jackson, and well as for the Molly Har-
ris (WL) and Kiara Jackson election. 
The results for the middle-income respondents 
for the Kiara Jackson elections show that middle-class 
blacks prefer liberal over conservative candidates. Ki-
ara Jackson lost to Imani Williams, with Imani Wil-
liams (BL) taking two-thirds of the vote. The results 
were not so different between Kiara Jackson (BC) and 
Katherine Miller (WC), although Kiara Jackson (BC) 
still took the majority. And in the Molly Harris (WL) 
versus Kiara Jackson contest results among middle-
class respondents, Kiara Jackson took 30.2 percent 
and Molly Harris took 69.8 percent. These numbers 
were about the same rates that Kiara Jackson and Mol-
ly Harris took in the low-income bracket. 
For the high-income category, respondents vot-
ed for Kiara Jackson (BC) 44.7 percent over Imani 
Williams’ (BL) 55.3 percent of the vote. In the same 
income range, the race between Kiara Jackson and 
Katherine Miller (WC) came out to be 60 percent for 
Kiara Jackson and 40.0 percent for Katherine Miller. 
And for the race between Kiara Jackson and Molly 
Harris (WL), Kiara Jackson received 43.5 percent of 
the vote, and Molly Harris received 56.5 percent. The 
chi-squared test for the high-income table, among all 
three races, was insignificant. The tables for each in-
come group in the Kiara Jackson elections are found 
below.
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Support for Kiara Jackson (Black conservative)
All income levels



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Molly Harris (WL) Elections
The next set of tables I chose to analyze among 
different income levels were those pertaining to the 
elections involving Molly Harris (WL) as a candidate. 
For respondents who were low-income, 36.2 percent 
voted for Molly Harris in the race between Molly Har-
ris and Imani Williams (BL), and 63.8 percent voted 
for her opponent. In the Molly Harris versus Katherine 
Miller (WC) contest, Molly Harris took 67.8 percent 
of the vote, while Katherine Miller took 32.2 percent. 
And in the third election between Molly Harris and 
Kiara Jackson (BC), Molly Harris took 72.1 percent, 
and Kiara Jackson took 27.9 percent of the vote. The 
results for all of the low-income tests on Molly Harris 
elections were statistically significant.
 In the middle-income division, Molly Harris 
took 38.9 percent of the vote, and her opponent Imani 
Williams took 61.1 percent. In the race between Molly 
Harris and Katherine Miller (WC), Molly Harris took 
59.6 percent of the vote, and Katherine Miller took 
40.4 percent. And in the race between Kiara Jackson 
(BC) and Molly Harris, Molly Harris took 69.8 per-
cent, and Kiara Jackson took 30.2 percent. The p-value 
for the Molly Harris versus Kiara Jackson election was 
0.0039, rendering the results for the race significant. 
The other two races were statistically insignificant. In 
this class division, Molly Harris took around the same 
numbers as in the lower income bracket, and Imani 
Williams (BL) did the same; however, the votes were 
a few percentage points higher for Molly Harris (WL) 
and a few lower for Imani Williams. In the election be-
tween Molly Harris and Katherine Miller (WC), Molly 
Harris took only around 60 percent of the votes, com-
pared to her 72 percent in the lower income elections. 
Katherine Miller, among middle-class respondents, 
took around 40 percent of the votes, but for lower 
class voters, she won only a little over 30 percent of the 
votes. 
For the high-income respondents who voted in 
elections in which Molly Harris (WL) was a candi-
date, the race between Imani Williams (BL) and Molly 
Harris turned out 38.6 percent for Molly Harris and 
61.4 percent for Imani Williams. In the race between 
Molly Harris and Katherine Miller (WC), Molly Har-
ris took 58.3 percent of the vote, and Katherine Miller 
took 41.7 percent. And in the election between Molly 
Harris and Kiara Jackson (BC), Molly Harris took 56.5 
percent of the vote, and Kiara Jackson took 43.5 per-
cent. The p-values for the high-income respondents 
in the Molly Harris races were not statistically signifi-
cant. These results showed that high-income respon-
dents preferred Imani Williams (BL) to Molly Harris 
at about the same rate as the lower two income groups. 
The tables below show the results for the Molly Harris 
elections.
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Support for Molly Harris (White liberal)
All income



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Katherine Miller (WC) Elections
Finally, the results for the Katherine Miller (WC) 
elections among income brackets are as follows. For 
the low-income bracket, Katherine Miller’s opponents 
beat her in each race. The most significant margin was 
between Molly Harris (WL) and Katherine Miller. 
This margin was 32 percent for Katherine Miller and 
68 percent for Molly Harris, which is not very surpris-
ing among low-income candidates. Katherine Miller 
still lost to each of her opponents. And for the high-
income bracket, Katherine Miller still lost handily, but 
no p-value showed significance in any race. The tables 
for the Katherine Miller elections are shown below.
Support for Katherine Miller (White conservative)
All income levels



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
By Age
Imani Williams (BL) Elections
I will now evaluate candidate choice across dif-
ferent age brackets. I chose to test if those born before 
and during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s 
ascribe to stronger feelings of linked fate than those 
born after. The youngest age bracket, removed from 
the Civil Rights Movement, is the age range from 
twenty to thirty-three. The middle age bracket consists 
of those ages thirty-four to fifty-one, and the oldest 
group consists of respondents over age of fifty-two. 
These respondents chose Imani Williams in each elec-
tion she took part of, each electing Williams at a rate 
of sixty percent. In each of these elections, the margin 
between Imani Williams and her opponent was statis-
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tically significant.
For the middle age group, Imani Williams still 
won each race but by lesser margins, and the margins 
were not great enough to be more than minimally 
significant in any of the races. For the youngest age 
group, Imani Williams won each race handily. The 
races between Katherine Miller (WC) and Imani Wil-
liams and Molly Harris (WL) and Imani Williams 
were both significant. The race between Kiara Jack-
son (WC) and Imani Williams was not statistically 
significant. Imani Williams won almost 73 percent of 
the vote over Molly Harris (WL), and 67 percent over 
Katherine Miller (WC).
Support for Imani Williams (Black Liberal)
All ages



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Kiara Jackson (BC) Elections
For the Kiara Jackson (BC) races, the oldest age 
group only preferred Kiara Jackson over Katherine 
Miller, the white conservative, but only by a margin of 
four percentage points. Kiara Jackson lost the rest of 
the races. Older respondents strongly preferred Molly 
Harris (WL) to Kiara Jackson, voting for Molly Harris 
at a rate of 75 percent to 25 percent. Similarly, they 
preferred Imani Williams (BL), the economically lib-
eral candidate, to Kiara Jackson. 
For the middle age group in the Kiara Jackson 
(BC) races, Kiara Jackson won the race only against 
Katherine Miller (WC), by 63 percent. Kiara Jackson 
lost to Imani Williams, but only by a slim margin of 
53 percent to 47 percent. Similarly, Kiara Jackson lost 
61 percent to 39 percent to Molly Harris, the white 
liberal. The older respondents preferred Molly Harris 
to Kiara Jackson at a rate of 75 percent to 25 percent. 
The youngest age group in the Kiara Jackson elec-
tions chose Kiara Jackson over Katherine Miller (WC) 
at a rate of 66 percent, and this margin was signifi-
cant. When Kiara Jackson was against Imani Williams 
(BL), respondents chose Imani Williams at a rate of 62 
percent to 38 percent. In the election of Kiara Jackson 
against white liberal Molly Harris, respondents chose 
Molly Harris 61 percent to 39 percent. Below are the 
results tables for the Kiara Jackson elections.
Support for Kiara Jackson (Black conservative)
All ages
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Born 1963-1980





























Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Molly Harris (WL) Elections
In the oldest age bracket, those born between 
1900 and 1962, white Liberal Molly Harris only lost to 
black Liberal Imani Williams, with 60 percent of the 
votes. Molly Harris won over both white conservative 
Katherine Miller and black conservative Kiara Jack-
son by 72 percent and 75 percent, respectively. Both 
of these margins showed the significance of opponent 
economic identity, meaning that older middle-class 
blacks may value a specific liberal economic ideology 
over the candidate’s race. 
For the middle age group in the elections involv-
ing Molly Harris, Molly Harris still won against white 
conservative Katherine Miller and black conservative 
Kiara Jackson, but not quite as handily. Molly Harris 
took 61 percent of the vote against Kiara Jackson, and 
67 percent of the vote against Katherine Miller. The 
margin between Katherine Miller and Molly Harris 
was statistically significant. The race between Molly 
Harris and black Liberal Imani Williams was fairly 
close, around 45 percent to 55 percent. 
In the youngest age group, Molly Harris lost to 
black liberal Imani Williams. Imani Williams won 72 
percent to 28 percent, making this race results statisti-
cally significant. Molly Harris and white conservative 
Katherine Miller tied exactly, and Molly Harris won 
against black Conservative Kiara Jackson, gaining 60 
percent of the vote. In comparison, for the two older 
age groups, Molly Harris won in a landslide. The tables 
for the Molly Harris elections crossed with age bracket 
are below.
Support for Molly Harris (White liberal)
All ages



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Katherine Miller (WC) Elections
Finally, white conservative Katherine Miller’s 
election results are as follows, as analyzed by age range. 
Among the oldest age range of respondents, Katherine 
Miller lost each election. The greatest margin was be-
tween her and white liberal Molly Harris, where Kath-
erine Miller took 28 percent of the vote and Molly 
Harris took 72 percent of the vote. This margin was 
significant. Black liberal Imani Williams and black 
conservative Kiara Jackson won over Katherine Miller 
by very slight margins. 
Among the middle age group of respondents, 
Katherine Miller still did not win any of the races. Be-
tween white conservative Katherine Miller and white 
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liberal Molly Harris was the largest margin of defeat, 
where Molly Harris took 67 percent of votes and Kath-
erine took 33 percent. This margin of difference was 
statistically significant. Similar to the oldest age group, 
black liberal Imani Williams took only about 53 per-
cent of the vote over Katherine Miller, who took 47 
percent. Black conservative Kiara Jackson took about 
63 percent of the vote against Katherine Miller’s 37 
percent. 
Finally, among the youngest age group in the 
contests with Katherine Miller, Katherine Miller lost 
the elections between black liberal Imani Williams 
and black conservative Kiara Jackson, but there was 
a draw between Katherine Miller and white liberal 
Molly Harris. Imani Williams won by a fairly large 
margin, enough to render the difference significant. 
And Kiara Jackson also won handily against Kather-
ine Miller, with 66 percent of the vote, and the results 
were also significant. Both Katherine Miller and Molly 
Harris received 50 percent of the vote from the young-
est group of respondents. The results for the Katherine 
Miller elections analyzed by age are shown below.
Support for Katherine Miller (White Conservative)
All ages



























































Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Values approximated to nearest whole number.




The eight questions that I chose to analyze 
regarding neighborhood demographics and quality in 
the survey were taken from the National Black Election 
Panel Survey from 1988.62 The choice of questions 
was inspired by Claudine Gay’s 2004 article “Putting 
Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental 
Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes,” which 
concerns the relation between neighborhood quality 
and make-up to linked fate.63 The questions were 
each analyzed across income groups by high, middle 
and low-income respondents. The first question 
asked was a question about the racial makeup of 
the respondent’s neighborhood. The answers to this 
question were “all black,” “mostly black,” “half black,” 
and “less than half black.” For the high-income group, 
about 53 percent of respondents said that they lived 
in neighborhoods that were half or more black, while 
about 47 percent said they live in neighborhoods that 
are less than half black. In the middle-income group, 
64 percent of respondents live in half or more black 
neighborhoods, while 36.25 percent of middle-class 
respondents live in neighborhoods with less than half 
blacks. The percentages for “mostly black” and “less 
than half black” 30 and 36 percent respectively, are 
similar in the case of middle-income respondents. 
The next question will show what perceived “class” of 
neighborhood each respondent lives in. The lower-
income respondents answered that 67 percent live in 
half or more black neighborhoods, and 33 percent live 
in less than half black neighborhoods. The low-income 
group has the highest percentage of respondents that 
live in both all black and mostly black neighborhoods, 
but not by a very large margin. For the low-income 
blacks, the percentage of those who live with less than 
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half blacks is surprisingly not much lower than that 
percentage for the middle class.
Neighborhood racial make-up
Income All black Mostly black Half black Less than 
half black
High 7% 26% 20% 47%
Middle 10% 30% 24% 36%
Low 11% 32% 23% 33%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The second question in the neighborhood 
section asks about the socioeconomic status of a 
respondent’s neighborhood. The answers to this 
question include “poor,” “working class,” “middle-
class,” “upper middle-class,” “upper-class,” and “I don’t 
know.” The results across all incomes are as follows. 
Respondents from poor neighborhoods made up 
4.19 percent of the total respondents. Those from 
the working class totaled 33.68 percent. In turn, 
30.68 percent responded that they were middle class, 
and 8.46 percent said that they were upper middle 
class. Upper-class neighborhood respondents made 
up 0.94 percent of the total respondents, and those 
who didn’t know their neighborhood’s social class 
responded 19.32 percent of the time. The analysis for 
those of high-income showed that about 31 percent 
lived in lower class neighborhoods, 46.26 percent 
lived in a middle-class neighborhood, and about 21 
percent lived in upper class neighborhoods. In sum, 
high-income respondents said that they lived in 
middle-class neighborhoods more than any type of 
neighborhood. For the middle class, almost 50 percent 
said they live in lower-class neighborhoods, and 39.50 
percent responded that they lived in a middle-class 
neighborhood. About 10 percent lived in upper-class 
neighborhoods. 1.88 percent of respondents said they 
did not know what class of neighborhood they lived 
in. In conclusion, most middle-income respondents 
said they live in lower class neighborhoods. 
For low-income respondents, almost 60 percent 
said they live in lower-class neighborhoods, whereas 30 
percent said they live in a middle-class neighborhood, 
and about 6 percent said they live in more upper-class 
neighborhoods. 5.8 percent of respondents did not 
know what kind of neighborhood they live in.
Neighborhood class status makeup











High 2% 29% 46% 19% 2% 2%
Middle 3% 45% 39% 9% 1% 2%
Low 10% 49% 30% 5% 1% 6%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next set of neighborhood questions 
asked about the quality of different resources and 
institutions in the respondent’s neighborhood. This 
set included questions about police protection, road 
maintenance, parks and playgrounds, public schools, 
and garbage collection. The first question asked 
about the quality of the police protection in each 
respondent’s neighborhood. The answer choices were 
“very dissatisfied,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” “somewhat 
satisfied,” and “very satisfied.” The high-income 
respondents were, on the whole, happier with their 
neighborhood’s police protection than low-income 
respondents.









High 5% 12% 54% 28%
Middle 10% 15% 52% 23%
Low 9% 19% 52% 20%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question regarding neighborhood 
quality dealt with residents’ satisfaction with 
neighborhood parks and playgrounds. The answer 
choices were the same as above. In terms of the 
highest income voters, about 18 percent were 
unhappy with the park and playground quality in 
their neighborhoods, while about 82 percent were 
satisfied with their neighborhood parks. Overall, the 
high-income respondents were very pleased with the 
status and quality of their local parks and playgrounds. 
For the middle-income respondents, about 32 percent 
were unhappy with the state of their parks. About 68 
percent were happy with their neighborhood’s park 
and playground quality. And as for the low-income 
respondents, about 31 percent were dissatisfied, and 
about 69 percent were happy with park quality. The 
middle- and lower- class respondent answers were 
similar, and if anything, the middle class was more 
satisfied. The upper-class respondents were almost 15 
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percentage points happier with their neighborhood 
parks and playgrounds.









High 6% 13% 49% 32%
Middle 10% 22% 40% 28%
Low 13% 18% 46% 23%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question regarding neighborhoods 
asked about respondent satisfaction with 
neighborhood public schools. The answer choices 
were the same as the about neighborhood quality 
questions. For the high-income bracket, around 28 
percent of respondents were dissatisfied with their 
public schools, and 72 percent were satisfied. For the 
middle-income bracket, the figures were fairly similar, 
29 percent and 71 percent, respectively. And among 
the low-income respondents, the satisfaction was 
about the same: 30 percent were dissatisfied, whereas 
70 percent disagreed.









High 9% 19% 44% 28%
Middle 13% 16% 44% 27%
Low 11% 19% 45% 25%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
For the next question, which gauged satisfaction 
with respondent neighborhood health clinics and 
hospitals, the answers were the same as the above. 
For high-income respondents, 15 percent were 
dissatisfied with health clinics and hospitals in their 
neighborhoods, and 85 percent were satisfied. For 
the middle-income respondents, these numbers 
were 18% dissatisfied and 81 percent satisfied. And 
lastly, for low-income respondents, 23 percent were 
unhappy with their local healthcare, and 76 percent 
were satisfied. There is a small jump from low-income 
to high-income dissatisfaction, from 15 percent to 
23 percent. This reveals that the quality of healthcare 
in low-income black neighborhoods may be slightly 
lower than in high-income neighborhoods.









High 6% 10% 51% 34%
Middle 5% 14% 41% 40%
Low 8% 16% 45% 32%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The last neighborhood quality question in 
the survey was about respondent satisfaction with 
neighborhood garbage collection. Again, the answer 
choices are the same as above, and the overall 
percentages for all income levels are as follows. Overall 
dissatisfaction with garbage collection is 16 percent, 
whereas general satisfaction is 83 percent. In the 
high-income bracket, the dissatisfaction is around 10 
percent, and the satisfaction is around 90 percent. For 
the middle-income respondents, the dissatisfaction 
is around 17 percent, and the satisfaction is near 83 
percent. And among low-income respondents, the 
overall dissatisfaction is around 23 percent, and the 
satisfaction is around percent. Not surprisingly, the 
low-income respondents have the lowest-quality 
garbage collection services, and the high-income 
respondents have the highest quality.










High 5% 5% 38% 52%
Middle 3% 10% 37% 50%
Low 6% 10% 40% 44%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
Overall, we see that the low-income respondents 
have the lowest-quality resources available in their 
neighborhoods, while higher-income respondents 
have access to higher-quality resources and are on 
average more satisfied with their neighborhood quality. 
This satisfaction, or lack thereof, has implications for 




The questions on linked fate come from the 
1988 Black National Election Panel Survey.64 These 
questions ask about the extent to which black 
respondents ascribe to Dawson’s notion of linked fate 
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and African American group consciousness. I chose 
eight questions to analyze by both income and age. The 
three income groups are those used previously. The 
age brackets are the same brackets described above 
as well. First, I will analyze the linked fate-themed 
questions by income bracket. The first question asks 
black respondents if they think that what happens to 
blacks in the United States affects them. The answers 
are “yes, a lot,” “yes, some,” “yes, not very much,” and 
“no, not at all.” I first looked at the answers for all the 
respondents. For the high-income bracket, those that 
agree with this description of linked fate and whose 
answers were “yes, a lot” or “yes, some”, make up 73 
percent of the total high-income bracket. For the 
middle-income group, those who agree that what 
happens to other blacks affects them, make up 70% 
of the bracket, and those who don’t really agree make 
up 30%. And among low-income voters, 73% have a 
sense of linked fate, and 27% do not.
Do you think that what happens generally to black 
people in this country will have something to do with 
what happens to your life?
Income Yes, a lot Yes, some Yes, not very 
much
No, not at all
High 28% 45% 13% 14%
Middle 31% 39% 12% 18%
Low 32% 41% 11% 16%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The second linked fate question asks respondents 
to answer whether they think that if black people don’t 
do well in life, it is because of their race. The answer 
choices for this question were “agree strongly,” “agree 
somewhat,” “disagree somewhat,” “disagree strongly,” 
and “neither agree nor disagree.” For the high-income 
section, 56 percent agree that blacks are kept back 
by their race, 39 percent disagree, and 4.3 percent 
neither agree nor disagree. The middle-income 
section answered that 48 percent agree, 42 percent 
disagree, and 9.6 percent did not agree or disagree. 
Interestingly, the middle class seems to ascribe less to 
this notion of linked fate than does the upper class, by 
8 percentage points. Among the low-income voters, 
53 percent agree, 38 percent disagree, and 9 percent 
are neutral. So, the high-income respondents show 
the highest degree of linked fate for this question, then 
low-income respondents, and the middle-income 
voters show the lowest degree. 
Agree or disagree: In the United States, if black people 
don't do well in life it is because they are kept back 












High 14% 42% 26% 13% 4%
Middle 13% 36% 25% 17% 10%
Low 15% 38% 21% 16% 9%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The third question asks if blacks as a whole are 
getting along well, and to what degree. The answer 
choices for this question are “very well,” “fairly well,” 
“not too well,” and “not well at all.” Again, I group the 
two “well” choices together and the “not well” choices 
together to get a more comprehensible depiction of 
respondent answers. For those in the high-income 
group, 60 percent believe that blacks are getting 
along well, and 40 percent believe the opposite. For 
middle-income blacks, 62 percent believe that blacks 
are getting along well, and 38 percent believe that they 
are not. And among low-income voters, 63 percent 
believe that blacks are getting along well, and 37 
percent believe that they are not.
Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along 
very well, fairly well, not too well or not well at all?
Income Very well Fairly well Not too well Not well at 
all
High 10% 50% 35% 5%
Middle 9% 53% 31% 6%
Low 13% 50% 28% 9%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The fourth question asks if respondents think 
that blacks as a group are getting along economically. 
The answer choices are the same as above. Among 
the high-income respondents, 43 percent said that 
blacks are getting along well, and 57 percent said that 
blacks are not getting along well. The middle-income 
group responded 43 percent of the time that blacks 
are getting along well, and 57 percent said that they 
are not. The low-income respondents answered that 
49 percent think blacks are doing well, and 51 percent 
answered that they are not. 
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Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along 
economically very well, fairly well, not too well or not 
well at all?
Income Very well Fairly well Not too well Not well at 
all
High 6% 37% 48% 10%
Middle 8% 35% 45% 12%
Low 10% 38% 39% 13%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The fifth question asks again about the economic 
position of blacks, but in comparison with that 
of whites. The five choices for this question were: 
“much better,” “somewhat better,” “about the same,” 
“somewhat worse,” and “much worse.” Overall, 19 
percent of respondents think the economic position 
of blacks is better than whites, 21 percent said the 
position is the same, and 59 percent said that blacks are 
worse off economically than whites. For high-income 
respondents, 18 percent said that the black position 
is better, 17 percent said that the black position is the 
same, and 65 percent said that the black position is 
worse than whites economically. Among the middle-
income respondents, 20 percent said that the black 
position is better, 20 percent said it is the same, and 
60 percent said that blacks are worse off than whites in 
the fiscal realm. And for low-income respondents, 20 
percent said the black position is better than whites, 
26 said the position of blacks is the same as whites, 
and 54 percent say that the black financial position is 
worse than whites.
On the whole, would you say that the economic 












High 8% 11% 17% 42% 23%
Middle 5% 14% 20% 38% 22%
Low 6% 14% 26% 35% 19%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question is whether the Movement for 
black rights has affected respondents. The answers to 
the question are “a lot,” “some,” “not very much,” and 
“not at all.” The results for the high-income class are 
as follows: 74 percent of respondents believe that the 
Movement did affect them, while 26 percent did not 
really feel that the Movement affected them. For the 
middle-income respondents, the percentages were 
exactly the same. And for low-income respondents, 
72 percent of respondents believe that the black 
Movement affected them, while 27 percent believe 
that the Movement did not affect them.
Do you think that the Movement for black rights has 
affected you personally, and if so, how much?
Income A lot Some Not very 
much
Not at all
High 32% 42% 20% 6%
Middle 29% 44% 17% 9%
Low 33% 40% 17% 10%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question asks if respondents feel close to 
other blacks, and if so, how close they feel. The answers 
are “very close,” “fairly close,” “not too close,” and “not 
close at all.” Again, I group responses by generally 
feeling close versus not generally feeling close. Eighty-
five percent of upper class respondents feel close to 
other blacks, while 14% do not feel so close to other 
blacks. Eighty percent of middle-class respondents 
feel that they are close to other blacks, while 20 percent 
do not feel close to other people of their race. Eighty-
three percent of lower-class respondents feel close to 
other blacks, while 18 percent do not feel as close.
Do you feel very close, fairly close, not too close, or 
not close at all to black people in this country?
Income Very close Fairly close Not too
close
Not close at 
all
High 33% 53% 13% 1%
Middle 33% 47% 18% 2%
Low 37% 45% 15% 3%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The final linked fate question asked respondents 
about a hypothetical mayoral election between two 
black candidates. The question asks what characteristic 
of one candidate would make the respondent vote 
for that candidate over their opponent. The options 
were: “qualification/experience,” “stand on issues,” 
“honesty/integrity,” “cares for all people/whole city,” 
“cares for black people first,” “competence/leadership,” 
“personality/charisma,” “Democrat,” “supports equal 
opportunity/no discrimination,” “cares for poor/
homeless,” and “other (please specify).” High-income 
respondents answered that they would choose the 
candidate based on their stand on issues 18 percent 
of the time, and 17 percent of the time they would 
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vote for the candidate who shows honesty/integrity. 
Sixteen percent of the time high-income respondents 
would vote for the candidate who cares for the whole 
city, and only 0.7 percent of the time would high-
income respondents vote for the candidate who puts 
black concerns first. Eleven percent of high-income 
respondents would vote for the Democratic candidate. 
Middle-income respondents had very much the same 
ages for the above listed vote-choices. For low-income 
respondents, the percentages also did not vary much. 
However, 2% of respondents of low-income would 
vote for the candidate who cares about black people 
first, but 18% would vote for those who care most for 

















High 9% 18% 17% 16% 1%
Middle 13% 18% 17% 17% 2%
















14% 2% 11% 8% 3% 0%
9% 2% 10% 9% 4% 0%
9% 1% 15% 10% 6% 1%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
By Age
For the first question on linked fate, asking about 
how much respondents feel that what happens to other 
blacks will affect them, 48 percent of older respondents 
ascribed to this sense of linked fate, while 52 percent 
did not really identify with it. For the middle-income 
group, 47 percent of respondents said that they 
believed in this kind of linked fate, while 53 percent 
did not really feel it too much. And for the youngest 
group, 43 percent of respondents said that they feel 
linked to other blacks, while 57 percent said that they 
do not feel this type of linked fate. It is interesting 
to note that around 40 percent of respondents in 
all age groups answered that they felt “some” linked 
fate. However, about a third of the oldest bracket of 
respondents said that they felt “a lot” of linked fate, 
compared to 30 percent and 28 percent of middle age 
and lower age bracket respondents, respectively.
Do you think that what happens generally to black 
people in this country will have something to do with 
what happens to your life?
Age Yes, a lot Yes, some Yes, not very 
much
No, not at all
Elder 34% 41% 11% 15%
Middle 30% 41% 12% 17%
Young 28% 43% 14% 16%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
For the question: “In the United States, if black 
people don't do well in life it is because they are kept 
back because of their race”, respondents were asked 
how strongly they agree with this statement. Analyzing 
for age groups, the oldest age group responded that 
54% agree with this definition of linked fate, 39 
percent of them did not agree, and 7 percent neither 
agreed nor disagreed. In the middle age group, 52 
percent agreed, 38 percent disagreed, and 10 percent 
neither agreed nor disagreed. And for the youngest 
age group, 51 percent agreed that if blacks don’t do 
well, it is because of race, and 42 percent did not agree 
with this statement. Seven percent neither agreed nor 
disagreed. Although these numbers are fairly similar, 
the oldest group, born before and during the Civil 
Rights Movement, has the highest degree of linked 
fate, though only by 3 percentage points. 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with 
the following statement: In the United States, if black 
people don't do well in life it is because they are kept 












Elder 14% 40% 27% 12% 7%
Middle 13% 39% 21% 17% 10%
Young 13% 38% 23% 18% 7%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The question that asks if blacks as a group are 
getting along well yielded the following results in 
the test across age brackets. For the oldest bracket, 
respondents said 45% of the time that blacks are doing 
well, and 55 percent of the time that blacks are not 
doing well. For the middle age group, 41 percent of 
respondents said that blacks as a group are getting 
along well, and 59 percent said that blacks are not 
getting along well. And for the youngest group, 49 
percent of respondents said they feel that blacks 
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are getting along well in the United States, while 51 
percent said that blacks are not getting along as well. 
Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along 
very well, fairly well, not too well or not well at all?
Age Very well Fairly well Not too well Not well
at all
Elder 4% 41% 44% 11%
Middle 10% 31% 46% 13%
Young 11% 38% 40% 11%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question is similar to the one above, 
but asks if respondents think blacks are economically 
doing well. For those born between 1900 and 1962, 
45 percent said that blacks are getting along well 
economically, and 55 percent said that blacks are not 
getting along well in the financial realm. Those in the 
middle age realm say 41 percent of the time that blacks 
are getting along well economically, and 59 percent 
of the time that black and not getting along so well 
economically. And in the young age group, those born 
between 1981 and 1994, 49 percent of respondents say 
that blacks are fine fiscally, while 51 percent do not 
feel this way about the economic situation of the black 
group.
Would you say that blacks as a group are getting along 
economically very well, fairly well, not too well or not 
well at all?
Age Very well Fairly well Not too well Not well
at all 
Elder 4% 41% 44% 11%
Middle 10% 31% 46% 13%
Young 11% 38% 40% 11%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question concerns a similar topic, but 
asks if this economic position is worse, better, or the 
same as whites. In the oldest age range, 16 percent 
of respondents feel that the economic position of 
blacks is better than whites, 20 percent feel that the 
position is about the same, and 64 percent believe that 
economically, blacks are worse off than whites. For the 
middle age group, 20 percent of respondents believe 
that blacks are better off than whites, 20 percent 
believe they are about the same, and 60 percent believe 
that blacks are worse off than whites economically. In 
the youngest age bracket, 22 percent feel that blacks 
are better off economically, 24 percent feel they are 
about the same, and 60 percent feel that blacks are 
worse off. Again, these numbers are not too different, 
although the older group agrees by 4 percent more 
than younger age groups that blacks are financially 
worse off than whites.
On the whole, would you say that the economic 












Elder 3% 13% 20% 45% 19%
Middle 6% 14% 20% 35% 25%
Young 9% 13% 24% 35% 19%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question is very salient for whether and 
how much each age group feels that the black rights 
Movement affected them personally. The existing 
would suggest that the older group to respond that 
they were more affected by the Movement than the 
younger respondents. The oldest group responded 
that 72 percent felt affected by the Movement, and 
28 percent did not feel as affected by it. Among the 
middle age respondents, 70 percent said they felt 
affected by the Movement, and 30 percent did not feel 
very affected by the Movement for black rights. And 
for the lowest age group, 79 percent said that they felt 
affected by the Movement, and 21 percent did not feel 
affected by the Movement.
Do you think that the Movement for black rights has 
affected you personally, and if so, how much?
Age A lot Some Not very 
much
Not at all
Elder 29% 43% 21% 7%
Middle 28% 42% 18% 12%
Young 38% 41% 15% 6%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The next question asks respondents how close 
they feel to other blacks in the country. For the oldest 
age group, 85 percent say that they feel close to other 
blacks, and 15 percent say they do not feel as close to 
other blacks. For the middle age group, 82 percent 
said they feel close to other blacks, and 18 percent said 
they do not feel as close to other blacks. Conversely, 
79 percent of young blacks say that they feel close to 
other people of their race, and 21 percent do not feel 
as close. The oldest age group seems to feel more of a 
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connection to other blacks than do other age groups 
of African Americans.
Do you feel very close, fairly close, not too close, or 
not close at all to black people in this country?
Age Very close Fairly close Not too
close
Not close at 
all
Elder 41% 45% 13% 1%
Middle 31% 51% 15% 3%
Young 31% 48% 17% 4%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
The final linked fate question about the 
hypothetical election between the two black candidates 
was analyzed in age brackets. The results are as follows. 
For the eldest age group, those respondents born 
between 1900 and 1962, just 0.3 percent answered 
that they would vote for the candidate who puts black 
people first, while 18 percent said that they would 
vote for the candidate who cares about the whole 
city. Thirteen percent said they would vote for the 
Democratic candidate. For the age group born between 
1962 and 1980, 1 percent said that they would vote 
for the candidate who prioritizes black issues, while 
16 percent said they would choose the candidate who 
takes the whole city’s needs into consideration. Twelve 
percent of the middle age group said they would vote 
for the Democrat. In the youngest age bracket, 3.6 
percent said they would vote for the candidate who 
takes on black needs first, and 17 percent said that 
they would choose the one who looks at the needs of 
the whole city. Eleven percent said they would vote for 
the Democratic candidate.
If there were only two black candidates running 
against each other for mayor in your city or town, 
what would be the most important factor that would 
















Elder 12% 13% 17% 18% 0%
Middle 7% 21% 17% 16% 1%















12% 0% 13% 9% 5% 0%
11% 1% 13% 9% 3% 1%
9% 4% 11% 9% 4% 0%
Values approximated to nearest whole number.
DISCUSSION
By Income
What can be concluded about different income 
and age groups of African Americans? For the low-
income group, overall, it seemed that economic policy 
was more important than just the perceived race of 
the candidate. Among these low-income respondents, 
Molly Harris, the white liberal, won handily over Kiara 
Jackson, the black conservative. Under the idea of racial 
linked fate, these results would not hold. Nevertheless, 
economic linked fate seems to be tying together 
the lower class of African Americans. However, in 
accordance with Dawson’s explanation of the “new 
Black Politics” as emerging from the roots of slavery 
and economic oppression, the black community has 
historically experienced a lower economic status.65 
Thus, that African Americans of low-income voted for 
a white candidate with a liberal fiscal policy is perhaps 
not so surprising. It would most likely go against 
the majority of the black group to vote for a fiscally 
conservative candidate as Kiara Jackson, even though 
she is black. Voting for the liberal candidate, no matter 
what the race, seems to still be aligned with the black 
political community.
 Low-income respondents are generally more 
likely to view the black position as slightly better 
than both the middle and high-income groups view 
it. The level of linked fate among low-income blacks 
could result from both being around only African 
Americans and thus not feeling like an out-group, 
in addition to low-income neighborhoods being less 
socially and politically active and thus potentially less 
united in these areas.
 About two-thirds of low-income respondents 
live in half or more black neighborhoods, about 
60 percent say they live in lower or working class 
neighborhoods, and 30 percent say they live in 
middle-class neighborhoods. In terms of satisfaction 
with neighborhood amenities, low-income blacks are 
happy enough with their police protection, parks and 
playgrounds, neighborhood schools, healthcare, and 
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garbage collection. Though the average satisfaction 
rate was a bit lower than that of middle-income 
respondents, the lowest percentage of satisfaction 
was 69 percent. Gay writes that, “In lower-status 
neighborhoods, where the absence of economically 
stable and secure families may erode a community’s 
organizational strength, the dearth of informal 
and formal institutions leaves residents largely 
disconnected from the ‘networks of communication 
and community learning’ (Cohen and Dawson 1993, 
290) so critical to the development and diffusion of 
African Americans.”66  
Lower income respondents thus may have a 
lower degree of black group unity, but above discussed 
is the high economic unity stressed by low-income 
African Americans. Indeed, though, the low-income 
respondents do not seem to display as strong of a 
racial group consciousness. This may also be because 
they live around mostly other African Americans, and 
so don’t feel as singled out as a higher status blacks 
might.
 Middle-income voters are in a unique 
position within the African American community. 
Because they are on an economic rise, voting for 
fiscally liberal policies may not always benefit or suit 
them. However, being African-American may make 
middle-class black voters more adherent to liberal 
fiscal policies. The middle class voted more strongly 
in favor of Imani Williams over Kiara Jackson than 
did both the lower and upper classes. In addition, in 
the race between Kiara Jackson and Molly Harris, 
middle-class respondents voted for Molly Harris 
nearly as strongly as did the lower class. However, the 
split between the votes for Katherine Miller versus 
Kiara Jackson among the middle class was low—
Kiara Jackson won by just 55 percent. The middle 
class still preferred the black conservative over the 
white conservative, but not by much. And in the race 
between the white conservative and white liberal, the 
results were 60 percent to 40 percent for the white 
liberal, but these were around the same%ages as the 
high-income respondents. In the first two races, the 
middle class respondents seemed to have the highest 
sense of linked fate of all the income groups, but in 
the second two cases, it seems like the middle class 
shows less concern for the black group as a whole. The 
middle class takes on both characteristics of the upper 
class and the lower class. Perhaps depending on where 
a middle-class respondent lives, their sense of linked 
fate may depend on where they work, or where on the 
income spectrum they lie.
 Middle-income respondents said that 64 
percent of them live in neighborhoods that are half 
or more black. Almost half said that they lived in 
lower class or working class neighborhoods, while 
about 40 percent said they lived in a middle-class 
neighborhood. Middle-income respondents are 
generally satisfied with their neighborhood police 
protection, public schools, hospitals and health clinics, 
and garbage collection services, with the lowest rate of 
satisfaction being 68 percent. Again, the middle class 
finds itself in the middle of black ideologies. They 
are generally satisfied with the available resources, 
but they live in mostly lower-class neighborhoods 
around other blacks. Thus, they may keep company 
with both middle- and low-income blacks, which 
most likely increases a sense of shared fate. However, 
Gay writes that, “African Americans who enjoy access 
to the resources and opportunities available in better 
neighborhoods may identify only weakly with the 
history of racial suffering that underlies notions of 
shared fate and predisposes blacks to view race as the 
defining interest in their lives.”67 As a result of these 
two contrasting environmental factors, it is difficult to 
predict how middle-class blacks will act politically. 
 For middle-income respondents, it seems that 
linked fate is not quite as strong. For the first few linked 
fate questions, middle-income respondents ascribed 
to the lowest degree of linked fate of both low and 
high-income respondents. In addition, they feel the 
least close to other blacks of all three income groups. 
Still, middle-income respondents feel as connected to 
the black group as do high-income respondents, and 
agree in a couple more areas with the high-income 
respondents. It is difficult thus to pin down middle-
income blacks, because of the countering forces of 
environmental factors. The sample of middle-class 
blacks in my study seemed to be more on the lower-
middle-class end of the spectrum but were fairly 
satisfied with the quality of their neighborhoods. 
In addition, they lived mostly among other blacks. 
However, there was a fairly broad spectrum of incomes 
included in this subset, and there was a substantial 
portion of middle-class blacks that lived among a 
minority of blacks. Perhaps these two ends of the 
middle-class spectrum had differing levels of linked 
fate, and thus cancelled each other out on some of 
the survey questions. The fact that most middle-class 
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respondents live amongst other blacks may increase 
sense of linked fate, but the fact that middle-class 
neighborhood resources are acceptable would negate 
this sense of linked fate. This is somewhat seen in the 
ambiguity of middle-class results, though there still 
exists a fairly strong sense of linked fate among middle-
class respondents overall; it is just not as consistently 
shown as either the upper or lower classes.
 Among the high-income respondents, trends 
included a seemingly high sense of linked fate. 
High-income respondents voted for Imani Williams 
over Kiara Jackson at about the same rate as did 
low-income respondents. This seems economically 
counterintuitive for high-income respondents, but 
perhaps this group still identifies strongly, in racial 
terms, with the black group. Otherwise, perhaps 
these economic policies might be helpful for the part 
of the spectrum that makes closer to $60,000, rather 
than the end that makes $100,000. In addition, the 
high-income respondents chose Molly Harris (WL) 
over Kiara Jackson (BC), even if only by a statistically 
insignificant margin. The high-income respondents 
also preferred Imani Williams over Katherine Miller, 
by a 61 percent margin, demonstrating again that race 
may be more important to high-income black voters 
than economic policy. 
 On the whole, high-income respondents 
were almost split on the number of blacks in their 
neighborhood, although just over half said that they 
were in mostly black neighborhoods. High-income 
respondents also reported that almost 50 percent of 
them lived in middle-class neighborhoods. High-
income respondents were happy with the police 
protection, parks and playgrounds, public schools, 
health clinics, and garbage collection services at rates 
of 72 percent or higher. Claudine Gay writes that 
since this sector of the black community has access 
to such good neighborhood resources, they should 
share a weaker sense of linked fate with the rest of the 
black community.68 Gay posits, “African Americans in 
neighborhoods with few amenities are more likely than 
African Americans in high-quality neighborhoods to 
view race as the defining interest in their lives.”69 This 
aspect of Gay’s hypothesis suggests that high-income 
African Americans will show a weaker sense of shared 
fate with other blacks. But, there are reasons to believe 
that high-income African Americans show a strong 
sense of shared destiny with African Americans.
High-income respondents tend to have about 
as strong a sense of linked fate as do low-income 
respondents. These respondents also have the highest 
tendency to believe that the black group as a whole is 
not doing well. High-income respondents also believe 
that blacks as a whole are worse off economically, over 
ten percentage points more so than do low-income 
respondents. Those of high-income also say they feel 
the closest to other blacks, closer than do both middle 
and low-income respondents.
 In conclusion, linked fate seems to be a 
salient factor among black voters of all incomes, but 
seems highest among high-income voters. This could 
confirm Claudine Gay’s hypothesis that, “African 
Americans in neighborhoods with high-status black 
residents are more likely than African Americans 
in low-status neighborhoods to view race as the 
defining interest in their lives.”70 Thus, those high-
income African Americans who live amongst other 
high status blacks are likely to have a stronger sense 
of linked fate. This is because these higher status 
neighborhoods often have more group activities that 
unite the community and foster the sharing of ideas, 
and lower income neighborhoods are less likely to 
have these institutions.71  However, the reason for 
strong linked fate among high-income blacks may 
be due to discrimination faced by inhabiting mostly 
white areas and frequently interacting with whites. 
High status blacks may be more willing to ascribe 
to the black group because they feel a stronger sense 
of group consciousness and unity with other blacks 
than among whites.72 These explanations involve 
the environmental reasons for linked fate, which 
are discussed further below in the neighborhood 
demographics and quality section of the analysis.
By Age
For the oldest age group, around half of 
respondents said they did ascribe to linked fate, and 
over half said that blacks are not getting along well 
economically. The oldest age group is also the most 
likely to believe that blacks are worse off economically 
than whites. Interestingly enough, the youngest age 
group expressed that the Movement for black rights 
affected them personally, more so than did the oldest 
age group. I had hypothesized that older blacks 
would have felt more moved by the rights Movement. 
Nevertheless, my survey questions did not specify 
which particular Movement for black rights was 
referred to. If the question had specified the Civil 
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Rights Movement of the 1960s, perhaps responses 
may have been different. Still, those born between 
1900 and 1962 demonstrate high levels of linked fate 
in general, and perhaps some of this could be linked 
to the fact that these respondents grew up before and 
during the Civil Rights Movement. 
 The middle age group had high linked fate, 
but did not take a clear side on whether it thought the 
black group is getting along well. This group also felt 
the least affected by the Movement for black rights, 
even though most in the age bracket were born during 
or right after the Movement. Overall, the middle age 
group had high levels of linked fate, though the oldest 
group was slightly higher.
 The youngest age group showed slightly lower 
levels of linked fate and connectedness to the black 
group overall, but, as mentioned above, those in the 
eighteen to twenty-five age bracket said they felt most 
moved by the Movement for black rights. In addition, 
3.5 percent of young respondents said they would vote 
for the black candidate who cares for black people 
first, while the other age group chose this option less 
than 1 percent. Perhaps younger black voters are more 
likely to ascribe to a black candidate, but do not really 
feel as close to other blacks as do older blacks. 
 Concluding from the results of the 
hypothetical elections as analyzed by age, the older 
two age groups showed more economic linked fate, 
while the youngest group in fact showed more racial 
linked fate. This was interesting, as I had expected that 
the groups born before and during the Civil Rights 
Movement would have had more racial linked fate, 
meaning that they would have voted for the candidate 
who was black. However, instead, these two groups 
voted at high rates for the candidates who exhibited 
the liberal fiscal policy, with the oldest group voting 
at even higher rates than the middle group. The 
youngest group was the most adamant about voting 
for the black candidate, and voted for Kiara Jackson 
and Imani Williams at higher rates than both the 
older groups. For the oldest group, it didn’t matter 
as much whether the liberal candidate was black 
or white, though the black liberal still won by a 20 
percent margin. What seemed to have mattered most 
was that the candidate was economically liberal. Like 
the lowest income group analyzed above, it seems that 
economic policy was more important in the elections 
than just the candidate’s race, likely because of 
Dawson’s explanation of the black group as one which 
comes from a background of economic subjugation.73 
Thus, African Americans of the older age groups may 
be more in tune with the liberal economic policy. 
Still, it is interesting that the younger group of voters 
had such strong racially linked fate. However, the 
Clemetson article referred to above discusses the race 
of a black Republican, Michael Steele, winning 30 
percent of the black vote in Baltimore by making radio 
ads on the Baltimore hip-hop stations.74 This black 
political leader’s appeal to young blacks is somewhat 
similar to what is seen in the younger contingency of 
survey respondents in the hypothetical elections, as 
they voted at fairly high rates for the black candidate 
no matter what fiscal policy they supported.
CONCLUSION
It can still be argued that because there was not an 
overwhelming amount of significant difference overall 
in strength of linked fate between incomes or age 
groups among the black community, black politicians 
can still appeal to a fairly unified black political group. 
All of the age and income groups ascribed to high 
levels of linked fate, and demonstrated that being 
African American is still more important than one’s 
economic status when choosing a political candidate. 
Still, emphasizing economic liberality seems to be 
an important facet of the black vote, regardless of 
race. We saw that the high-income respondents still 
strongly preferred a white liberal candidate to a black 
conservative candidate, one who in fact matches along 
both racial and fiscal lines. All things considered, the 
black group seems to be a solidly unified and unique 
political unit with a tendency toward economic 
liberality. 
Some parts to further the scope of this project 
would be to analyze survey questions across education 
level as well as neighborhood quality. Claudine Gay 
analyzed the neighborhood makeup via education 
level in her 2004 article, and Gay also wrote about 
the effects of neighborhood quality and resources on 
one’s sense of linked fate.75 I hinted at the potential 
that neighborhood quality might have on linked 
fate, but did not run a cross-tabulation with my own 
data to test this hypothesis. There are several other 
cross-tabulations that would bring more light to the 
question of the salience of race versus socioeconomic 
status, such as crosses with perceived social class, and 
zip code. In addition, visiting the four New Jersey 
townships directly and conducting an in-person, 
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qualitative study on resources and conditions of each 
town would inform the neighborhood/linked fate 
correlation as well. With the dataset, there is much 
more that can be learned about African Americans, 
linked fate, and politics.
In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether 
the monolithic black group will ever break up. It has 
in some ways, but the core of the African American 
political group remains strong. Dawson writes in his 
2001 book, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary 
African-American Political Ideologies:
On issues of taxes, partisanship, the role of 
government, fiscal policy, and the like, blacks 
remain on the left and unified—more unified 
across class than whites, but on issues of strategy, 
tactics, and norms of the black quest for social 
justice, large cleavages can be detected even 
using the crude instrument of the public opinion 
survey.76
Arguably, some of the “institutions and networks 
within the black community that reinforce racial 
schema,” which Dawson discusses in his 2001 book, 
could include recent police brutality as well as mass 
incarceration.  Both the extreme overrepresentation of 
blacks in the criminal justice system, and the “Black 
Lives Matter” Movement in response to recent police 
brutality, exemplify the way that blacks still face racial 
distinction. These two phenomena demonstrate an 
existing racial structure, which arguably contributes 
heavily to the monolithic nature of the black political 
group. With distinctly racially biased events still 
occurring, it makes sense that African Americans 
would continue to stick together politically on terms 
of race.
By better understanding the black community, 
its history, and its politics, we can know more about 
how such a politically bonded group exists. This can 
inform political leaders, activists, and group members 
about how to further engage black politics. Race is still 
pertinent in American politics, as much, if not more so 
than economic ideology, and this is something worth 
paying attention to. Ultimately, we cannot truly know 
or understand American politics without furthering 
our knowledge of black politics.  
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